Several circumstances speak in favour of the military scenario outlined by foreign commentators. The first is the recent experience of the Russian armed forces and the political consequences of their use. Moscow intervened in Georgia’s conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, quickly changing the situation and recognising the two autonomies as independent states. In 2014, Russia carried out a lightning-fast operation in Crimea, creating conditions for the subsequent referendum on reunification. Later, the Ukrainian army was defeated in Donbass, and the political consequence was the formation of the LPR and DPR.
In 2015, Moscow radically changed the military situation in Syria by deploying a compact but highly effective air group. The political result has been the preservation of power in the hands of the Assad government and the defeat of a number of terrorist groups. All these events indicate that Russia is ready to use force suddenly, in a concentrated manner and at the same time to seek concrete political changes.
The second circumstance is that the international political consequences for Russia which resulted from the military campaigns were relatively insufficient. No foreign state has intervened openly in these conflicts. Foreign military aid does not radically alter the balance of power. Economic sanctions in their current form harm the Russian economy, but they are still not the main factor contributing to existing problems. The economy itself is stable. In short, there are no major checks and balances on a new military campaign.
The third circumstance is that Russia is not ready to bear with the existing status quo in relations with Ukraine. Kiev is almost openly talking about sabotaging the Minsk agreements, and is not ready to implement them. The US and the EU cannot or do not want to change this; while at the same time they are verbally calling on Russia to abide by the agreements. Ukraine itself, after 2014, for obvious reasons, has been pursuing an anti-Russian line. The events of 2014 significantly strengthened the position of the nationalists. Any attempt to pursue a political dialogue with Russia is deemed unacceptable. A “mopping-up” of politicians who are in any way loyal to Russia is under way. Militarily weak and fearful of further complications with Moscow, Ukraine is seeking to deepen its defence ties with the United States and its allies, as well as trying to expand military aid and supplies. In Moscow, this is perceived as the “utilisation” of the territory of Ukraine by Western countries and is accompanied with subsequent threats to the strategic interests of Russia. Moscow considers the emergence of Western military infrastructure in Ukraine only a matter of time.
Taking into account these circumstances, a scenario where Russia takes action can be hypothetically considered in the West and in Ukraine in the following vein. With a sudden and decisive blow in several directions at once, Russian troops dismember the armed forces of Ukraine in the East of the country, surround separate groups, or press them against the Dnieper river. The actions of tank and motorised units are accompanied by powerful air, missile and artillery strikes. The Russian Aerospace Forces seize air supremacy. The apotheosis of the operation should be the encirclement and the subsequent capture of Kiev, and the stabilisation of the front line along the Dnieper. The creation of a new Ukrainian state with the capital in Kiev would be announced and recognised by Russia. It would include the previously-independent DPR and LPR. Russia thereby resolves several historical problems at once. The immediate threat to the southwestern borders is removed. Full control over the Sea of Azov and a land corridor to the Republic of Crimea are ensured. Two Ukrainian states appear on the map, one of which should be “friendly and fraternal”.
Even if one fails to write off this scenario as a reflection of existing phobias and nationalist complexes, it still seems unlikely for a number of reasons.
First, such a military conflict is unlikely to culminate in any intelligible agreement. A victory over the armed forces of Ukraine will not by itself lead to a fast peace. The war could develop into a long and sluggish confrontation, especially if part of the territory (for example, Western Ukraine) remains under the control of the Ukrainian armed forces. Capturing the whole of Ukraine is technically possible. However, it will be more costly, and subsequent control would be much more difficult. The option of “two Ukrainian states” would allow Russia to squeeze nationalists out by sending them West. Under a “one Ukraine” scenario, this would be impossible, given all the ensuing consequences.
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Second part is a fair assessment. The first part is not complete though. Georgia is analogous to Ukraine in the interior ethnic group regions. Like parts of eastern Ukraine and Crimea. But at the time Georgia was almost completely invisible to the whole of the western world. Even today after the fact most in the US wouldn’t know it exist. Ukrainian was and is a much different situation in that regard.
Syria for any who knew its recent history has been a nation in long established alliance with Russia. Different from any other nation in the Middle East. So it shouldn’t have been a surprise to anyone that Russia stepped in to support them. If as I believe it was in the beginning some western nations encourage rebel movements in Syria with arms and advisers. It’s was a major strategic mistake assuming Russia wouldn’t respond similar to as that did.
Regarding the Minsk agreements there already broken with Donboss and Crimea and Russia should have known that as well.
Much talk is given here recently to Putin’s “red lines”. Putin should consider the red lines given by the west in the form of military aid and diplomatic support.
Two Ukraine’s might be a temporary fix but it would be a inadequate one. Any military land grab would result in western military technology pushed even farther East towards Russia’s boarders. Including the Baltic states. So Putin might gain a hundred or so kilometers of buffer but he will find more and more western military forces and equipment much closer to Russia that it has been since WW2.
A two state solution in Ukraine would not pacify the situation much past the time it took the ink to dry. It will cause animosity’s and conflict to continue within what is Ukraine with little green men from East and West doing what they do.
Deconfliction and long term economic and exchange in the region is the only thing that will bring about stable boarders and peace.
But what we have is Belarus, “nationalist” in eastern Ukraine, and the remains of Crimea. So this will continue until it escalates and there is war again.
How big and how bad who knows.