Ukraine is increasingly tightening its military cooperation with Turkey. However, the Turkish-Ukrainian alliance will not bring Kiev closer to NATO, but it may lead Ukraine to a catastrophe if it decides to settle the problem of Donbas and Crimea by armed forces.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky suggested a few days ago in one of the Russian TV programs that Ukraine will start a war with Russia over Crimea and Donbass, which it will lose and its army will be defeated. Then the Polish army will come to her aid, which will also be defeated, and finally the German army, which will lead to the division of Ukraine. A new state, Galicia, will emerge and Russia will absorb the rest. You can laugh at this vision because if you take it literally, it is absurd. But these words can also be treated as preparations for Russia to implement a scenario based on provoking Ukraine to war and then leading it to defeat. Of course, neither Poland nor Germany will take part in it, but they can feel its effects. The division of Ukraine may actually take place, but not between Russia and Germany, but between Russia and Turkey
Russian journalists covering the war in Arcach repeatedly mentioned in private conversations that they expected a new war in the Donbas soon. And their forecasts corresponded strongly to what Żyrinowski said: the West, pushing Kiev into an armed conflict with Russia, would be responsible for the escalation. Of course, Turkey also appeared in these talks, which my Russian interlocutors treated as the West's ally against Russia. The problem is that this is a false vision. In the sense that Turkey by no means represents the interests of the West. Moreover, it aims to push Western influence out of successive theaters of rivalry and transform them into conflict arenas, and then include them in the system of Russian-Turkish trade fairs. It is often useful to Russia, as Western influence poses a greater threat to it than Turkey's imperial aspirations. If the Ukrainian authorities do not understand this, the country may face a catastrophe.
After 2014, Russia almost completely lost its influence not only on the Ukrainian government, but also largely on the local society, especially in the western and central part of the country. Such a division of Ukraine, which would mean the possibility of absorbing at least part of it, would therefore be beneficial for the Kremlin, even in a much more modest version than the one described by Zhirinovsky, i.e. limited to a few eastern oblasts. The Kremlin's goal here is not only to implement its imperial policy, but also to solve its own demographic problem. In Russia, the number of Russians is systematically decreasing, and the number of Muslims is growing, including migrants and their descendants. This, in turn, threatens with internal cultural inconsistency in the long run. It is possible to wonder what is the bond of the Russian Federation apart from the power structures of this state? Meanwhile, Russia still needs migrants to "plug" its demographic gap. That is why Russia is interested in absorbing the Slavic population (Ukrainians, Belarusians), or at least the Christian Indo-European population (e.g. Armenians, Ossetians), in order to balance this cultural incoherence, closer to Russian culture and relatively easy to assimilate the Slavic-Christian element.
During the last Azerbaijani-Armenian war, Ukraine sided with Baku on two grounds. Firstly, the Ukrainians saw an analogy between Arcach and Donbass and Crimea. Second, they saw the war in the South Caucasus as a proxy clash between Turkey and Russia, where Azerbaijan and Armenia would represent the interests of Ankara and Moscow, respectively. This was an incorrect assessment in both respects. Reducing Arcach and Donbas to the same separatism and threat to territorial integrity is to ignore the significant differences between the two cases. Moreover, Ukraine, by tightening its relations with Turkey, is also inconsistent in this regard, for example, given the role of Turkey in the Cyprus question.
A consequence of a misjudgment of the nature of the Arcach conflict is also that the conclusions about its results are incorrect. In this context, Armenia's defeat does not mean a defeat for Russia, on the contrary. Russia has strengthened itself in the South Caucasus, eliminating Western influence with the hands of Turkey. Building there, in a strategic place for itself, its strong military presence. Turkey's entry into this region was at the expense of pushing out the Western influence that appeared there, which was the optimal solution from Moscow's perspective, as it is the West, not Ankara, that constitutes the key threat to it.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky suggested a few days ago in one of the Russian TV programs that Ukraine will start a war with Russia over Crimea and Donbass, which it will lose and its army will be defeated. Then the Polish army will come to her aid, which will also be defeated, and finally the German army, which will lead to the division of Ukraine. A new state, Galicia, will emerge and Russia will absorb the rest. You can laugh at this vision because if you take it literally, it is absurd. But these words can also be treated as preparations for Russia to implement a scenario based on provoking Ukraine to war and then leading it to defeat. Of course, neither Poland nor Germany will take part in it, but they can feel its effects. The division of Ukraine may actually take place, but not between Russia and Germany, but between Russia and Turkey
Russian journalists covering the war in Arcach repeatedly mentioned in private conversations that they expected a new war in the Donbas soon. And their forecasts corresponded strongly to what Żyrinowski said: the West, pushing Kiev into an armed conflict with Russia, would be responsible for the escalation. Of course, Turkey also appeared in these talks, which my Russian interlocutors treated as the West's ally against Russia. The problem is that this is a false vision. In the sense that Turkey by no means represents the interests of the West. Moreover, it aims to push Western influence out of successive theaters of rivalry and transform them into conflict arenas, and then include them in the system of Russian-Turkish trade fairs. It is often useful to Russia, as Western influence poses a greater threat to it than Turkey's imperial aspirations. If the Ukrainian authorities do not understand this, the country may face a catastrophe.
After 2014, Russia almost completely lost its influence not only on the Ukrainian government, but also largely on the local society, especially in the western and central part of the country. Such a division of Ukraine, which would mean the possibility of absorbing at least part of it, would therefore be beneficial for the Kremlin, even in a much more modest version than the one described by Zhirinovsky, i.e. limited to a few eastern oblasts. The Kremlin's goal here is not only to implement its imperial policy, but also to solve its own demographic problem. In Russia, the number of Russians is systematically decreasing, and the number of Muslims is growing, including migrants and their descendants. This, in turn, threatens with internal cultural inconsistency in the long run. It is possible to wonder what is the bond of the Russian Federation apart from the power structures of this state? Meanwhile, Russia still needs migrants to "plug" its demographic gap. That is why Russia is interested in absorbing the Slavic population (Ukrainians, Belarusians), or at least the Christian Indo-European population (e.g. Armenians, Ossetians), in order to balance this cultural incoherence, closer to Russian culture and relatively easy to assimilate the Slavic-Christian element.
During the last Azerbaijani-Armenian war, Ukraine sided with Baku on two grounds. Firstly, the Ukrainians saw an analogy between Arcach and Donbass and Crimea. Second, they saw the war in the South Caucasus as a proxy clash between Turkey and Russia, where Azerbaijan and Armenia would represent the interests of Ankara and Moscow, respectively. This was an incorrect assessment in both respects. Reducing Arcach and Donbas to the same separatism and threat to territorial integrity is to ignore the significant differences between the two cases. Moreover, Ukraine, by tightening its relations with Turkey, is also inconsistent in this regard, for example, given the role of Turkey in the Cyprus question.
A consequence of a misjudgment of the nature of the Arcach conflict is also that the conclusions about its results are incorrect. In this context, Armenia's defeat does not mean a defeat for Russia, on the contrary. Russia has strengthened itself in the South Caucasus, eliminating Western influence with the hands of Turkey. Building there, in a strategic place for itself, its strong military presence. Turkey's entry into this region was at the expense of pushing out the Western influence that appeared there, which was the optimal solution from Moscow's perspective, as it is the West, not Ankara, that constitutes the key threat to it.