- Joined
- Nov 4, 2017
- Location
- Detroit, Michigan, USA
Thank you for the quick response @Spyglass. It isn't easy to keep up sometimes while I'm working. I appreciate the websites you have shared. Much of the information I have been following comes from the CDC and state and territorial health departments. For those of you who don't mind reading more technical information, I highly recommend subscribing to the CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) and their Health Alert Network (HAN). The mainstream media is doing a reasonable job of reporting the facts. Still, they keep reporting (correctly, I might add), that the risk to the general population is low at the moment. This does miss some of the nuances of what is occurring, however.
I am particularly concerned about some studies that have come out about the prevalence of antibodies in dairy workers in Michigan and Colorado. There was an article in the MMWR that was published back in November that showed that approximately 7% of the dairy workers who were tested in that study had evidence of recent infection with H5N1 influenza. Furthermore, only about half of those who had antibodies reported feeling ill at some point. Here is a link to the article in case someone wishes to read it:
Serologic Evidence of Recent Infection with Highly ..
There have also been anecdotal reports of scores of dairy workers in California feeling ill after coming into contact with known infected herds. However, many of these workers did not report symptoms due to fear of either losing their jobs or getting into trouble with immigration authorities. This means that the number of "spillover" infections from cattle to humans is probably quite a bit higher than what is being reported to the CDC. It is important to remember that anytime this virus spreads, there is a chance that it could mutate to spread more efficiently between humans. I am very concerned about the possibility of someone being co-infected with a seasonal influenza virus and the H5N1 virus. This could lead to the dreaded "recombination" event that could set things in motion.
As for @farmboy 's observation, it is difficult to say if H5N1 will move through the population more rapidly than COVID-19. As you have pointed out, it can depend on whether the virus acquires the ability to spread among humans while in an animal or human host. Theoretically, if there is a large reservoir of animals that the virus can infect as efficiently as humans, this would cause the basic reproduction number (R0) to be higher than if this strictly spread among humans. At this point, since we don't have a virus that is spreading in a sustained manner between humans, we can't estimate some of the epidemiological properties such as the R0 or the Case Fatality Rate (CFR). It is also important to note that the R0 of the original strain of SARS-CoV-2 was exceptionally high, and the Omicron strain of the virus has evolved to have an R0 somewhere between that of polio and measles.
If I had to make an educated guess as to the R0 of a hypothetical pandemic strain of H5N1, I would estimate that it would probably be between 2 to 4. This would be similar to the original strain of SARS-CoV-2, as well as the average of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic strain. I cannot give an estimate on what a theoretical Case Fatality Rate would be, simply because we do not know what form the virus will take. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the CFR was estimated to be around 6%; this was revised sharply downward to around 1-2% once it was recognized that there was widespread asymptomatic infection. The 1918 influenza pandemic was estimated to have an average CFR of 2.5%, with some locations having a CFR of 5% or greater during the wave of autumn 1918.
I hope that this provides some insight into what is going on. We still have a few stages to go through before we are in a pandemic, but the situation is somewhat concerning. I urge everyone to please take this time to go over their pandemic preparedness plans, as this will be much easier before we hit an SHTF scenario.
I am particularly concerned about some studies that have come out about the prevalence of antibodies in dairy workers in Michigan and Colorado. There was an article in the MMWR that was published back in November that showed that approximately 7% of the dairy workers who were tested in that study had evidence of recent infection with H5N1 influenza. Furthermore, only about half of those who had antibodies reported feeling ill at some point. Here is a link to the article in case someone wishes to read it:
Serologic Evidence of Recent Infection with Highly ..
There have also been anecdotal reports of scores of dairy workers in California feeling ill after coming into contact with known infected herds. However, many of these workers did not report symptoms due to fear of either losing their jobs or getting into trouble with immigration authorities. This means that the number of "spillover" infections from cattle to humans is probably quite a bit higher than what is being reported to the CDC. It is important to remember that anytime this virus spreads, there is a chance that it could mutate to spread more efficiently between humans. I am very concerned about the possibility of someone being co-infected with a seasonal influenza virus and the H5N1 virus. This could lead to the dreaded "recombination" event that could set things in motion.
As for @farmboy 's observation, it is difficult to say if H5N1 will move through the population more rapidly than COVID-19. As you have pointed out, it can depend on whether the virus acquires the ability to spread among humans while in an animal or human host. Theoretically, if there is a large reservoir of animals that the virus can infect as efficiently as humans, this would cause the basic reproduction number (R0) to be higher than if this strictly spread among humans. At this point, since we don't have a virus that is spreading in a sustained manner between humans, we can't estimate some of the epidemiological properties such as the R0 or the Case Fatality Rate (CFR). It is also important to note that the R0 of the original strain of SARS-CoV-2 was exceptionally high, and the Omicron strain of the virus has evolved to have an R0 somewhere between that of polio and measles.
If I had to make an educated guess as to the R0 of a hypothetical pandemic strain of H5N1, I would estimate that it would probably be between 2 to 4. This would be similar to the original strain of SARS-CoV-2, as well as the average of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic strain. I cannot give an estimate on what a theoretical Case Fatality Rate would be, simply because we do not know what form the virus will take. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the CFR was estimated to be around 6%; this was revised sharply downward to around 1-2% once it was recognized that there was widespread asymptomatic infection. The 1918 influenza pandemic was estimated to have an average CFR of 2.5%, with some locations having a CFR of 5% or greater during the wave of autumn 1918.
I hope that this provides some insight into what is going on. We still have a few stages to go through before we are in a pandemic, but the situation is somewhat concerning. I urge everyone to please take this time to go over their pandemic preparedness plans, as this will be much easier before we hit an SHTF scenario.
just quarantine the geese in there night pen 100’x50’ many structures for shelter.
