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This goes beyond the earlier statements from individual lawmakers arguing that Iran should leave the NPT. There has already been considerable parliamentary pressure — including a statement signed by 130 MPs — and a withdrawal proposal had previously been submitted. The new element is that a member of the parliamentary leadership is publicly describing an expedited withdrawal measure as presently under review and specifying the rapid procedure that could follow formal tabling.
Russia has reacted publicly. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 29 September that Moscow had taken note of Nikzad's remarks, wanted clarification, and did not want Iran to withdraw from the NPT, which Russia considers a cornerstone of the non-proliferation system.
Actual Iranian withdrawal from the NPT would be one of the most consequential nuclear developments of the current conflict. It would substantially worsen the verification problem surrounding Iran's nuclear programme and could be interpreted by Washington and Israel as evidence that Iran was moving towards an unconstrained nuclear option.
The procedural distinction is critical, however. Iran has not withdrawn from the NPT, parliament has not passed withdrawal legislation, and the measure apparently has not yet completed the formal tabling process. There also remains significant opposition inside Iran to withdrawal; some Iranian figures have argued that leaving the treaty would unnecessarily increase pressure on Tehran.
This is therefore a movement in the decision-making process, not a decision to leave the treaty.
Russia has reacted publicly. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 29 September that Moscow had taken note of Nikzad's remarks, wanted clarification, and did not want Iran to withdraw from the NPT, which Russia considers a cornerstone of the non-proliferation system.
Actual Iranian withdrawal from the NPT would be one of the most consequential nuclear developments of the current conflict. It would substantially worsen the verification problem surrounding Iran's nuclear programme and could be interpreted by Washington and Israel as evidence that Iran was moving towards an unconstrained nuclear option.
The procedural distinction is critical, however. Iran has not withdrawn from the NPT, parliament has not passed withdrawal legislation, and the measure apparently has not yet completed the formal tabling process. There also remains significant opposition inside Iran to withdrawal; some Iranian figures have argued that leaving the treaty would unnecessarily increase pressure on Tehran.
This is therefore a movement in the decision-making process, not a decision to leave the treaty.
