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Western governments are increasingly asking their populations to consider the possibility of conflict with Russia. Warnings about national resilience now sit alongside discussions of public sacrifice, wartime healthcare, and the defence of critical infrastructure. On 26 October, the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom jointly identified Russia as the most acute, long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security.1
The pattern warrants attention. Several governments appear to be preparing public attitudes as well as military capabilities. Yet the available evidence supports a more qualified conclusion than a belief that war is coming: officials increasingly regard armed confrontation as a credible (as opposed to theoretical) danger that requires preparation, while continuing to assess that a major attack is neither imminent nor inevitable.
The distinction matters. Preparing for war can reflect an expectation that fighting will occur, an attempt to prevent it through deterrence, or a judgement that its consequences would be too severe to leave unaddressed. The same measure may serve all three purposes. Understanding the apparent mindset requires examining the specificity, timing, and context of official statements.
Britain offers a particularly direct example of an effort to change public expectations. In remarks reported on 15 October, General Sir Roly Walker, the head of the British Army, said political leaders would begin a “frank conversation” with citizens about danger, sacrifice, and their role in national defence. His remarks connected civilian support with the possibility that soldiers would have to fight.2
On 19 October, Defence Secretary Wes Streeting endorsed Walker’s comments in Parliament. He also described a national resilience public awareness campaign, a wider conversation about defence, and efforts to involve businesses, emergency services, and the public.3 This establishes government support for preparing society mentally. It does not establish that ministers have privately concluded that war is probable.
France has similarly placed national attitudes within its defence planning. Its July 2025 strategic review identified open war in the heart of Europe as the principal threat through 2030 and called for the country to be materially and morally prepared for a major conflict. The document resulted from work involving multiple ministries, rather than an isolated military speech.4
In November 2025, France’s chief of defence, General Fabien Mandon, explained his warning of a possible confrontation within three to four years. He linked the urgency to the pattern of Russian aggression and to the possibility that Moscow would perceive an opportunity in Europe.5 Such reasoning comes closer to anticipating a future military challenge than merely acknowledging that war is theoretically possible. Nevertheless, a possible confrontation remains different from a forecast that one will occur.
German intelligence officials have also described an increasingly concrete threat. At a parliamentary hearing on 5 October 2026, BND President Martin Jäger warned that Germany was in danger of entering a violent conflict with Russia. Military intelligence chief Martina Rosenberg contrasted earlier abstract threats with concrete attacks against Germany.6 The immediate context included sabotage and covert violence, so these remarks should not be treated as an unqualified prediction of conventional war.
Civilian planning provides another indicator. In May, Norway instructed health authorities to prepare plans for making 7,000 beds available for civilian and military war casualties. The government described this as a planning estimate; the beds would become available through wartime adaptation of the health service.7 In October, Swedish authorities announced geographically specific healthcare planning for war, including emergency hospitals based on existing provision in northern Sweden.8
These measures show that governments are considering how their societies would function under wartime conditions. Their evidential value lies in the involvement of civilian institutions and the specificity of the requirements. They reveal a serious planning assumption, although they cannot by themselves establish how likely officials believe war to be.
The most significant recent warning about a nearer-term military confrontation came from Denmark. On 24 September, its defence intelligence service assessed a low but growing risk of limited Russian military attacks against NATO countries bordering Russia. Such attacks, it said, could potentially occur within months, even while the Ukraine war continued and without Russia possessing the capability for a larger regional war.9
This identifies a potential route into hostilities that does not depend on preparations for a full-scale invasion. A limited strike, incursion, or miscalculation could create a dangerous confrontation before either side had decided to fight a general war. Denmark’s assessment therefore deserves attention, including its explicit qualification that the risk remains low.
There are, however, substantial reasons to avoid reading every preparedness campaign as evidence that governments anticipate fighting.
Maintaining emergency plans is a normal responsibility of government. The European Union’s preparedness programme encompasses natural disasters, health emergencies, infrastructure disruption, and security threats. Its guidance on household self-sufficiency for at least 72 hours addresses that wider range of risks.10 Emergency supplies are useful across several scenarios, so advice to obtain them is a weak indicator of an expectation of war specifically.
The pattern warrants attention. Several governments appear to be preparing public attitudes as well as military capabilities. Yet the available evidence supports a more qualified conclusion than a belief that war is coming: officials increasingly regard armed confrontation as a credible (as opposed to theoretical) danger that requires preparation, while continuing to assess that a major attack is neither imminent nor inevitable.
The distinction matters. Preparing for war can reflect an expectation that fighting will occur, an attempt to prevent it through deterrence, or a judgement that its consequences would be too severe to leave unaddressed. The same measure may serve all three purposes. Understanding the apparent mindset requires examining the specificity, timing, and context of official statements.
Britain offers a particularly direct example of an effort to change public expectations. In remarks reported on 15 October, General Sir Roly Walker, the head of the British Army, said political leaders would begin a “frank conversation” with citizens about danger, sacrifice, and their role in national defence. His remarks connected civilian support with the possibility that soldiers would have to fight.2
On 19 October, Defence Secretary Wes Streeting endorsed Walker’s comments in Parliament. He also described a national resilience public awareness campaign, a wider conversation about defence, and efforts to involve businesses, emergency services, and the public.3 This establishes government support for preparing society mentally. It does not establish that ministers have privately concluded that war is probable.
France has similarly placed national attitudes within its defence planning. Its July 2025 strategic review identified open war in the heart of Europe as the principal threat through 2030 and called for the country to be materially and morally prepared for a major conflict. The document resulted from work involving multiple ministries, rather than an isolated military speech.4
In November 2025, France’s chief of defence, General Fabien Mandon, explained his warning of a possible confrontation within three to four years. He linked the urgency to the pattern of Russian aggression and to the possibility that Moscow would perceive an opportunity in Europe.5 Such reasoning comes closer to anticipating a future military challenge than merely acknowledging that war is theoretically possible. Nevertheless, a possible confrontation remains different from a forecast that one will occur.
German intelligence officials have also described an increasingly concrete threat. At a parliamentary hearing on 5 October 2026, BND President Martin Jäger warned that Germany was in danger of entering a violent conflict with Russia. Military intelligence chief Martina Rosenberg contrasted earlier abstract threats with concrete attacks against Germany.6 The immediate context included sabotage and covert violence, so these remarks should not be treated as an unqualified prediction of conventional war.
Civilian planning provides another indicator. In May, Norway instructed health authorities to prepare plans for making 7,000 beds available for civilian and military war casualties. The government described this as a planning estimate; the beds would become available through wartime adaptation of the health service.7 In October, Swedish authorities announced geographically specific healthcare planning for war, including emergency hospitals based on existing provision in northern Sweden.8
These measures show that governments are considering how their societies would function under wartime conditions. Their evidential value lies in the involvement of civilian institutions and the specificity of the requirements. They reveal a serious planning assumption, although they cannot by themselves establish how likely officials believe war to be.
The most significant recent warning about a nearer-term military confrontation came from Denmark. On 24 September, its defence intelligence service assessed a low but growing risk of limited Russian military attacks against NATO countries bordering Russia. Such attacks, it said, could potentially occur within months, even while the Ukraine war continued and without Russia possessing the capability for a larger regional war.9
This identifies a potential route into hostilities that does not depend on preparations for a full-scale invasion. A limited strike, incursion, or miscalculation could create a dangerous confrontation before either side had decided to fight a general war. Denmark’s assessment therefore deserves attention, including its explicit qualification that the risk remains low.
There are, however, substantial reasons to avoid reading every preparedness campaign as evidence that governments anticipate fighting.
Maintaining emergency plans is a normal responsibility of government. The European Union’s preparedness programme encompasses natural disasters, health emergencies, infrastructure disruption, and security threats. Its guidance on household self-sufficiency for at least 72 hours addresses that wider range of risks.10 Emergency supplies are useful across several scenarios, so advice to obtain them is a weak indicator of an expectation of war specifically.