Reimagining Russia, Reimagining Peace

[william]

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the West understandably focused on the immediate demands of war. Policymakers debated sanctions, military aid, energy security, and deterrence. The objective was clear: help Ukraine survive. Yet even in those early months, a larger strategic question lingered beneath the surface: What geopolitical order should the United States seek once the war ended?

Two years ago, I argued that American policymakers were asking the wrong question about Russia. The debate had become consumed by how to confront, punish, isolate, or weaken Moscow. Missing from the discussion was a serious consideration of what a favorable long-term strategic outcome might actually look like. Strategy doesn’t boil down to merely winning today’s battles. Indeed, it’s also about shaping tomorrow’s realities.

Peace agreements are not self-executing. The history of diplomacy is filled with accords that looked impressive on paper but failed because leaders neglected the harder task of preparing their societies for compromise. The challenge facing Ukraine and Russia is therefore not simply to end military operations. It is to create the political, social, and economic foundations that allow peace to survive.

The most important strategic question extends beyond Ukraine itself.

For all the attention devoted to Russia over the past decade, the defining geopolitical challenge of the twenty-first century is not Russia. It is the growing competition between the free world and the authoritarian model advanced by the Chinese Communist Party. This reality does not diminish the importance of Ukraine. It clarifies why the conflict must eventually end.

The United States has a profound interest in preventing a permanent alignment between Russia and China. Such an alignment is not preordained. Historically, Russia has been wary of becoming the junior partner in any geopolitical relationship. As China’s economic and demographic weight continues to grow, Moscow’s dependence on Beijing becomes increasingly uncomfortable for Russian strategists. A stable settlement in Ukraine could create the conditions for Russia to gradually rebalance its foreign policy and regain strategic flexibility rather than drift deeper into China’s orbit.

This does not mean embracing the Kremlin or ignoring profound differences with Moscow. It means recognizing that great powers must distinguish between permanent enemies and temporary alignments. The long-term objective of American strategy should not be a world in which Russia and China become an inseparable bloc opposing the West. It should be one in which Russia finds greater prosperity, security, and opportunity through normalized relationships with Europe and the broader Western world than through increasing dependence on Beijing.

Indeed, the most successful outcome for the United States may ultimately be one in which both Ukraine and Russia become stakeholders in a stable European order. Ukraine would remain firmly integrated with the West, contributing military innovation, industrial capacity, and strategic depth to the democratic world. Russia, over time, would recognize that its long-term interests are better served by engagement with Europe and North America than by serving as a resource appendage to China. Such an outcome may seem ambitious today. Yet history repeatedly demonstrates that yesterday’s adversaries can become tomorrow’s partners when statesmen have the courage to look beyond the passions of the moment.

The ultimate objective should not be the permanent isolation of Russia or the perpetual militarization of Europe. It should be the construction of a stable geopolitical framework in which Ukraine is firmly anchored in the West, Europe assumes greater responsibility for its own defense, Russia gradually moves away from strategic dependence on China, and the United States is able to concentrate greater attention on the larger challenge that will define the coming century.

History’s greatest statesmen are not remembered because they won every battle. They are remembered because they correctly identified the central challenge of their age and built durable institutions capable of meeting it. The challenge before the West today is not merely to end a war. It is to secure a peace that strengthens Ukraine, stabilizes Europe, reduces China’s leverage over Eurasia, and creates a geopolitical environment in which both Ukrainians and Russians find greater opportunity alongside the West than against it.

Reimagining Russia, Reimagining Peace - Lyceum

History’s greatest statesmen aren't remembered because they won all battles. We know them because they met the central challenge of their age

lyceumnow.com

 

[DEFCON Warning System]

Russia is making a huge mistake aligning with China. China does not see Russia as an equal partner.

The enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend.

 

[GBS61]

Russia is making a huge mistake aligning with China. China does not see Russia as an equal partner.

The enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend.

She had no choice; otherwise, it would have meant their economic demise. It saved us from a Russian nuclear attack against...the West.

For the Russians, the atomic weapon is the ultimate weapon of last resort;
the danger is not yet over.