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How the US is keeping its decades-old land-based missiles running — and why Russia’s effort looks very different.
When the United States launched the first of its LGM‑30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in June 1970, the Cold War still loomed large. Fifty-plus years later, those same missiles remain the bedrock of America’s land-based strategic deterrent. But how long can a system designed half a century ago continue to perform? And how does it compare to the ICBM force of Russia, whose nuclear posture often moves under darker, more difficult-to-see terms?
Age and endurance: the US case
The Minuteman III was produced between 1970 and 1978. Nearly all of the missiles in the US arsenal today trace their manufacture to that era. But they are far from “fossilised” relics gathering dust in silos. Instead, they have undergone at least two major overhaul programmes—the Guidance Replacement Programme (GRP) and the Propulsion Replacement Programme (PRP)—investments in new rocket motors, upgraded electronics and re-manufactured stages that keep the missile viable for modern demands.
Maintenance on the Minuteman enterprise is a massive undertaking. The missile system spans more than 600 facilities across five states, including around 450 silos, plus the command, control and support infrastructure. Every one of those sites must keep functioning while the US builds its next-generation missile, the LGM‑35A Sentinel.
In September 2025, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded it is feasible to keep the Minuteman III in service until around 2050—if sustainment continues apace and Sentinel delays do not deepen. That would mean the system reaches or exceeds 80 years in service—an extraordinary lifespan for any military technology.
But there are subtle risks. A system built on Cold War-era architecture must contend with component obsolescence, ageing silos and infrastructure, and the evolving requirements of missile readiness, security and cyber resilience.
Russia’s ICBM posture: younger overall, but with shadows
In contrast, Russia’s land-based strategic missile force is, in broad stroke, younger than the United States’s. The backbone today is the RS‑24 Yars—a solid-fuel, road- and rail-mobile ICBM first deployed about 2010. Its successor, the RS‑28 Sarmat, was declared in limited service in 2023, though the flight-test record has been uneven and public data on how many are deployed remains scarce.
Yet Russia’s arsenal is not wholly modern. Some systems trace back to the Soviet era. The liquid-fuel R‑36M2 (SS‑18) (introduced in the 1970s) remains in limited service, and the UR‑100N UTTKh (SS‑19 Mod 4)—also of Soviet vintage—has been converted to carry the hypersonic Avangard glide vehicle. The effect: Russia’s missile force is a patchwork of new deployments and extended legacy systems.
Russia publicly estimates its ICBM-leg has about 330 missiles carrying up to 1,250 warheads (open-source estimate). The US, under the now-lapsed New START tally, fields about 400 deployed ICBMs, though life-extension makes exact numbers fluid.
What the comparison reveals
Questions for the horizon
If the Minuteman III remains serviceable until 2050, how will the US sustain the thousands of components, the command infrastructure, and the human skills required? Conversely, how rapidly can Russia retire its oldest systems and scale up the Sarmat and Yars baselines—and what stability risks or maintenance burdens does that era-overlap pose?
What is certain is this: both nations regard their ICBM legs not as simple hardware, but as pillars of deterrence. Yet the age, maintenance burdens and replacement paths are visibly different—and those divergences may shape the margins of strategic stability for decades to come.
When the United States launched the first of its LGM‑30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in June 1970, the Cold War still loomed large. Fifty-plus years later, those same missiles remain the bedrock of America’s land-based strategic deterrent. But how long can a system designed half a century ago continue to perform? And how does it compare to the ICBM force of Russia, whose nuclear posture often moves under darker, more difficult-to-see terms?
The Minuteman III was produced between 1970 and 1978. Nearly all of the missiles in the US arsenal today trace their manufacture to that era. But they are far from “fossilised” relics gathering dust in silos. Instead, they have undergone at least two major overhaul programmes—the Guidance Replacement Programme (GRP) and the Propulsion Replacement Programme (PRP)—investments in new rocket motors, upgraded electronics and re-manufactured stages that keep the missile viable for modern demands.
Maintenance on the Minuteman enterprise is a massive undertaking. The missile system spans more than 600 facilities across five states, including around 450 silos, plus the command, control and support infrastructure. Every one of those sites must keep functioning while the US builds its next-generation missile, the LGM‑35A Sentinel.
In September 2025, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded it is feasible to keep the Minuteman III in service until around 2050—if sustainment continues apace and Sentinel delays do not deepen. That would mean the system reaches or exceeds 80 years in service—an extraordinary lifespan for any military technology.
But there are subtle risks. A system built on Cold War-era architecture must contend with component obsolescence, ageing silos and infrastructure, and the evolving requirements of missile readiness, security and cyber resilience.
In contrast, Russia’s land-based strategic missile force is, in broad stroke, younger than the United States’s. The backbone today is the RS‑24 Yars—a solid-fuel, road- and rail-mobile ICBM first deployed about 2010. Its successor, the RS‑28 Sarmat, was declared in limited service in 2023, though the flight-test record has been uneven and public data on how many are deployed remains scarce.
Yet Russia’s arsenal is not wholly modern. Some systems trace back to the Soviet era. The liquid-fuel R‑36M2 (SS‑18) (introduced in the 1970s) remains in limited service, and the UR‑100N UTTKh (SS‑19 Mod 4)—also of Soviet vintage—has been converted to carry the hypersonic Avangard glide vehicle. The effect: Russia’s missile force is a patchwork of new deployments and extended legacy systems.
Russia publicly estimates its ICBM-leg has about 330 missiles carrying up to 1,250 warheads (open-source estimate). The US, under the now-lapsed New START tally, fields about 400 deployed ICBMs, though life-extension makes exact numbers fluid.
- Age vs refresh: The US is operating aging missiles (1970s-vintage) but keeping them viable through refurbishment. Russia is deploying newer systems (2010s onward) but still relies on Cold War-era platforms.
- Replacement strain: For the US, the pace of Sentinel delays puts extended service of Minuteman III under the spotlight. For Russia, the logistical challenge lies in phasing out or converting legacy boosters while rolling out Sarmat.
- Operational posture: The US has emphasised continuous readiness with a defined silo-based infrastructure and public oversight. Russia’s posture, while moving towards modernity, retains secretive elements—legacy systems, dual-purpose conversions and less transparency.
If the Minuteman III remains serviceable until 2050, how will the US sustain the thousands of components, the command infrastructure, and the human skills required? Conversely, how rapidly can Russia retire its oldest systems and scale up the Sarmat and Yars baselines—and what stability risks or maintenance burdens does that era-overlap pose?
What is certain is this: both nations regard their ICBM legs not as simple hardware, but as pillars of deterrence. Yet the age, maintenance burdens and replacement paths are visibly different—and those divergences may shape the margins of strategic stability for decades to come.