I would assume Biden already got preapproval for any retaliatory measures from Congress on the event Russia uses nukes
I would assume Biden already got preapproval for any retaliatory measures from Congress on the event Russia uses nukes
saw this:Here's one of those other questions to the forum. I'm getting a little bit of scuttlebutt stating that China has a fairly small convoy that has entered Ukraine from Russia. Not saying it's true, not saying it's false, but you guys have better sources than I do. So, I thought I'd better throw that out there to start looking. It's supposed to be a few of the heavy military trucks, but also followed with humvee's.
I believe your last paragraph is the motivator of these voices. These stances are not being made on strength.While I agree with you about supporting Ukraine. Being a guarantor of Ukraines sovereignty does have its limits.
I would also disagree with the equating neutrality and appeasement.
Neutrality is a policy position based on non-interference outside of serving your own nations self interest. It is live and let live and not becoming directly involved in another nation or nations domestic or international disputes unless it is necessary to protect one’s own legitimate interest or survival.
Appeasement is simply the taking of a weak self-serving position of letting other nations do things that are hurtful or damaging out of fear of the consequences or political expediency.
One is rooted in weakness and fear and is almost always damaging in the long run.
The other in confidence and strength. Being neutral can sometimes be the wrong choice. Appeasement is always the wrong choice
I agree advocating for a cease fire and appeasement are not the same thing.Advocating a cease-fire to stop Ukrainian people being killed and to buy time is not appeasement. Unfortunately, too many are convinced that these are synonymous.
No disagreement, just remember that what what one person might adamantly see a certain policy position as appeasement. Another might view it as a completely reasonable and fair policy choice.I believe your last paragraph is the motivator of these voices. These stances are not being made on strength.
Correct but what is needed now is a clear and defined wartime goal for the end to this war.Yes a cease fire can only benefit Russia now. General Patton’s philosophy was you don’t give your enemy a chance to rest and you keep pounding them night and day.
A lasting cease fire would be appeasement. It would basically turn all occupied land into Russian land, in practice. A short cease fire, maybe, but that gives Russia too much time.I agree advocating for a cease fire and appeasement are not the same thing.
You can only advocate for a stable lasting cease-fire if you do not resort to appeasement.
Appeasement is used as a negative pejorative to criticize any given policy position. It’s always subjective.
And that is why I mention the necessity of a clear and definitive goals of the west and Ukraine.A lasting cease fire would be appeasement. It would basically turn all occupied land into Russian land, in practice. A short cease fire, maybe, but that gives Russia too much time.
Strategic ambiguity is really necessary for the West over this. For many reasons mostly to save our asses. Drawing lines is never good for nuclear powers.And that is why I mention the necessity of a clear and definitive goals of the west and Ukraine.
First it’s honest to our own citizens. And secondly it sends a clear message to Russian citizens that the collapse or invasion of Russia is not anticipated.
We have mostly failed at this though.
Encouraging Ukraine to give in to Russian demands is appeasement.A lasting cease fire would be appeasement.
Yet when we enter the waters of strategic ambiguity we always worry and fret it will escalate.Strategic ambiguity is really necessary for the West over this. For many reasons mostly to save our asses. Drawing lines is never good for nuclear powers.
Ukraine has been very clear what the end game is for them - liberation of all Ukrainian territories including Crimea, so a return to 2013 borders. The West says it support this, so it doesn’t seem ambiguous.Correct but what is needed now is a clear and defined wartime goal for the end to this war.
All the sides involved have been ambiguous for what the end of hostilities should look like. Mostly because no one was even sure what was a possible outcome. Recent Historic boarders. But without Crimea. The breakaway republics returned or set free?
This is not a good comparison. Crimea is not currently at risk of being recaptured by the Ukrainian forces, nor was it at risk in July and August when the Ukrainian strikes happened. They also predated the Kharkiv offensive and, in general, there was much less pressure on the Kremlin to escalate at the point in time ISW is referring to.Ukrainian strikes into Russian-annexed Crimea clearly demonstrate that Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s illegally annexed territory do not automatically trigger Russian retaliation against NATO, as Simonyan would have her readers believe.
It does not. Exactly the same thing is currently going on in the occupied Kherson Oblast. Pretty much the only "odd man out" is the Zaporozhye Oblast but the situation is changing by the minute so it's way too early for ISW to make such a claim.This latest annexation discussion also omits other parts of Russian-occupied southern Ukraine in which the Kremlin was previously planning sham annexation referenda. A willingness to abandon the promise to bring all the occupied areas into Russia at the same time would be a significant retreat for Putin to make in the eyes of the hardline pro-war groups he appears to be courting.
While it is true that the Kremlin does not have full control over the goings-on in the occupied Donbas, this action does not looke as though some gung-ho local apparatchiks have jumped the gun. Rather, it appears coordinated and deliberate, as confirmed by its geographical spread, synchronization and the early reactions coming from the Kremlin (cf. Medvedev's latest tg post). It is also getting a lot of air time in Russian media. This is much unlike anything that has happened up to this point in regard to the possible "referenda".The Kremlin’s proxies in Donbas regularly outpace Kremlin messaging, on the other hand, and may have done so again.
Well annexing the breakaway republics would defiantly help them reframe the public opinion argument.
While ISW is, in general, a trustworthy source of balanced analyses, there are some significant problems with this one in particular. I'll try to list them briefly below, referring to specific claims made in the update.
This is not a good comparison. Crimea is not currently at risk of being recaptured by the Ukrainian forces, nor was it at risk in July and August when the Ukrainian strikes happened. They also predated the Kharkiv offensive and, in general, there was much less pressure on the Kremlin to escalate at the point in time ISW is referring to.
It does not. Exactly the same thing is currently going on in the occupied Kherson Oblast. Pretty much the only "odd man out" is the Zaporozhye Oblast but the situation is changing by the minute so it's way too early for ISW to make such a claim.
While it is true that the Kremlin does not have full control over the goings-on in the occupied Donbas, this action does not looke as though some gung-ho local apparatchiks have jumped the gun. Rather, it appears coordinated and deliberate, as confirmed by its geographical spread, synchronization and the early reactions coming from the Kremlin (cf. Medvedev's latest tg post). It is also getting a lot of air time in Russian media. This is much unlike anything that has happened up to this point in regard to the possible "referenda".
Of course, holding a sham referendum doesn't automatically translate into any changes in the momentum of the ground war. The obvious question is therefore - what does the Kremlin have riding on the back of this? Unfortunately, the possible answers are almost universally very bad (and that's another thing missing from the ISW report). I therefore respectfully disagree with ISW's assessment and would suggest keeping close tabs on the situation.
Meduza is quoting some unnamed Kremlin administration officials as saying that the "war party" (Medvedev, Zolotov, Turchak, etc.) managed to change Putin's mind over the last week. Apparently the new big idea is that Ukraine will not dare attack "Russian" territory (which... yeah ), but if they do, partial mobilization + marshal law will ensue. They also say to watch out for reshuffles in the MoD and the presidential administration.Well annexing the breakaway republics would defiantly help them reframe the public opinion argument.
“Oh look, there attacking Russian sovereign territory”
I don’t know as it would work. But I can see the reasoning.