| UA-RU WAR | NATO Crisis | ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

[teekay99]

One could easily make the same argument for a U.S. China conflict in the future. China has 4x more people.

China is a massive country. China can lose tens of millions of men, and they have lots of other millions of men. The United States doesn't have that kind of manpower.

It just isn’t a valid justification.

ooh I like that analogy better!

 

[GBS61]

The US will ultimately look out for its own interests.

Now, that is true for any country. Don't let's pretend otherwise.

Do you actually have any evidence regarding other Western countries?
It is true that countries look out for their own interests, but not to the point of helping the enemy the way Trump does.
And it is quite clear that Trump is pro-Putin; in fact, Putin is his idol.

 

[GBS61]

5 Russian suicide drones have struck northern Moldova over the past day.
1 Moldovan citizen was wounded in one of the strikes.
Russia keeps wounding and killing Europeans even outside of Ukraine

Moldova is not a NATO member.
Russia could even invade it; the other non-members are Austria and Switzerland. The US and NATO won't do anything—NATO is currently being blocked by the US.

Russia is gloating and can do whatever it wants.

 

[RiffRaff]

One could easily make the same argument for a U.S. China conflict in the future. China has 4x more people.

China is a massive country. China can lose tens of millions of men, and they have lots of other millions of men. The United States doesn't have that kind of manpower.

It just isn’t a valid justification.

In that situation, China also has the added logistical nightmare of trying to launch a conventional attack across the Pacific Ocean, vastly making it more difficult for them.

 

[Publius]

Trump clearly does not understand basic warfare 101 if he thinks he can make a troop-to-troop comparison and leave it there. Strategically, it's generally accepted that an invading army needs a 3:1 ratio of troops over the defender's troops to achieve a decisive victory, and that's not taking into account civilian counterinsurgency operations. It's also accepted doctrine that if you do not establish air superiority in the defender's airspace, losses of invading ground forces will far exceed losses of defending forces, and that has been the case for most of this war.

From day one I wondered why Putin did not establish air superiority before sending in ground forces. It's a classic mistake, and he hasn't corrected it for five years.

There's also psychology involved. Russians don't believe in this war. Ukrainians are highly invested in defending their homeland. "One man defending his home is worth more than ten hired soldiers."

We can argue over minutia for a millennium, and it still would not change the fact that the US did not honor its promise made in the Budapest Memorandum when Russia invaded, starting with Crimea. That is a failure that spans across four Presidential administrations, two of them Democrats and two of them Republicans. Had we honored that agreement back in 2014, Russia would not have been emboldened to launch a full-scale invasion eight years later. Crimea was the litmus test, and the US failed it. The United States of America reneged on a written promise made to Ukraine. We have absolutely nothing to be proud of here, and it's no wonder other countries don't trust us.

Thank you Riff Raff for responding to the question. And you might be correct about several key factors. Should the west cave to an aggressive force in Europe AND Ukraine like this. NO we have failed as a nation in this commitment. But not just a particular administration but multiple administration and congress.

My concerns are not so much about what is the right policy because evidently no one wants to that pay that cost. Rather what might produce the most optimal results with the mess we have.

Regarding the sizes of assaulting force required I would point out this is not completely static assumption. It assumes the assaulting force that is waging war is doing so with traditional western sensibilities of war. It’s safe to assume the more willing an aggressor is to wage total war and inflict massive damage and casualties even against civilian targets. The more this estimation is overstated.
Russia has demonstrated they have no problem doing just this. Yet NATO nations would not support Ukraine attacking high concentration civilian targets.

Domestic polls in Ukraine show support for complete victory slipping and rising for a negotiated settlement.
Zelinski’s #’s are dropping and Putin’s is steady in the mid to high 80’s.
It’s important to remember populations in different countries do not assign the same expectations and demands as western populations will. So we can’t assess support for Putin based on what we as westerners might think.

I suppose my motivating concern for continuing the war vs negotiations goes back to momentum. Specifically lack of momentum for Ukraine and the west.
If I remember one of the major concerns everyone had when the war started was in it devolving into a war of attrition, exactly as it has. A war of attrition with increasing casualties that involves several nuclear nations.

You could be correct about Ukraine being able to outlast Russia in an attrition war.
Everyone’s observation that Trump is definitely courting Russia more to negotiate is true. But I don’t think it’s completely accurate to fault this as a pure betrayal. Perception can be molded into almost limitless ways.
Other than optics and how it is this being painted. Temporarily lifting sanctioning on diesel is not very different than other nations that have continued to allow Russian oil or gas products to be imported “out of necessity”.
But of course that’s just comparative speculation.

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have been the most recent effective tactic used by Ukraine. Those have been escalatory attacks against critical Russian infrastructure, and logical ones at that. What other types of attacks can Ukraine launch that does or doesn’t involve a greater direct nato involvement or expanded weapons.
Ukraine has patriots HIMARS and ATACAM’s. Most of the remaining weapons platforms to send to Ukraine are very limited due to logistics and training.
I’ve argued for NATO forces in Ukraine for air-cap, artillery, bombing. Little to no interest in that from anyone in the west, even here.

We are now risking a complete loss for Ukraine, or a gradually increasing risk of escalation between nato and Russia. I don’t think anyone can say with confidence which way this might go.

In my opinion the only clear path to victory for Ukraine involves NATO troops inside Ukraine, taking loses. While supporting major logistics, ground force and air cover and bombing. Which Russia is going to respond to with more drone and short range ballistics. And you know the only way to counter that involves attacks on military and logistical sites in Russia.
I don’t see any western population tolerating western losses in a stalemated war of attrition long.

We lost momentum during Ukraines first counter attacks and drives into Kherson and towards Mariupol in 2022. That is a bitter pill to swallow. Momentum is a short term advantage, yes. But we have seen little periods of momentum advantage for Ukraine since.
What would be necessary from the west to regain momentum for Ukraine is more costly than anyone except Ukrainians are willing to pay. Even the Polish and Lithuanian population do not support there troops being sent to Ukraine.