Wargaming US & China Hypothetical Future Conflict to See if it Goes Nuclear

[NuclearID]

It doesn’t happen at all the way you are insisting. You are wrong and completely in error.

No sir, you are. An I say that sincerely, because clinging to this outdated Cold War logic isn’t just dated, it’s dangerous.

This isn’t 1962 or even the 80's don't come close to compare anymore.

The systems are faster, the fog is thicker, the stakes are higher, and yet somehow, you’re still treating escalation like it’s governed by turn based doctrine and rational pacing. It’s not. It hasn’t been for a long time.

 

[NuclearID]

I genuinely hope no one in real world command thinks like you or the others defending this outdated mindset.

Because if they do... and the next war starts under even half the condition you all are modeling here, we won’t be debating theory. We’ll be watching how fast it all unravels in real time and wondering how we let outdated assumptions guide us off the edge.

 

[RiffRaff]

Let's settle down. Both of you have valid points.

First, Cold War 1.0 nuclear strategy is no longer viable. We do have to start thinking in terms of Cold War 2.0 nuclear strategy.

Second, unless foreign missiles have already been launched and have been confirmed en route to the US, no one at the Pentagon is panicking and pushing the button without conferences first. Naval commanders do not have independent launch authority. It has to come from the NCA.

And I need to adhere to that first point myself. Under Cold War 1.0 US nuclear policy, they considered an aircraft carrier (single ship) a strategic asset, and the deliberate destruction of that asset by enemy attack *could* (not *will*) result in a nuclear response. I have made the assumption that the US still has that policy now, and I don't know that for sure.

 

[Erecon]

Is there a way to get around the initial satellite destruction, and EMPs taking out the electronics to fight a modern war the way you guys are thinking?

 

[NuclearID]

Is there a way to get around the initial satellite destruction, and EMPs taking out the electronics to fight a modern war the way you guys are thinking?

Military systems and equipment almost all of it is EMP hardened.

It's just civilian infrastructure and society at large that isn't. Civilian life isn’t EMP hardened. But EMPs can’t take out military second strike capabilities, not anymore at least. It’s not the 1980s, guys.

Again when C3I (command, control, communications, & intelligence) starts getting hit, nukes are going to start flying shortly after.

By that point, if we’re physically targeting satellites and major communication centers, we’re already past the threshold for uncertainty to start making bad split second decisions.

 

[NuclearID]

Let's settle down. Both of you have valid points.

First, Cold War 1.0 nuclear strategy is no longer viable. We do have to start thinking in terms of Cold War 2.0 nuclear strategy.

Second, unless foreign missiles have already been launched and have been confirmed en route to the US, no one at the Pentagon is panicking and pushing the button without conferences first. Naval commanders do not have independent launch authority. It has to come from the NCA.

And I need to adhere to that first point myself. Under Cold War 1.0 US nuclear policy, they considered an aircraft carrier (single ship) a strategic asset, and the deliberate destruction of that asset by enemy attack *could* (not *will*) result in a nuclear response. I have made the assumption that the US still has that policy now, and I don't know that for sure.

Appreciate you! Thanks for the dose of clarity.

Totally with you it’s not about assuming naval commanders are going rogue or nukes fly at the first hit, which I didn't say nor is the point?

It’s about recognizing that doctrine can lag behind conditions, and when the conditions change fast whether through C3I disruption, satellite loss, or escalation fog decision making doesn’t always follow or alow a clean script or ladder...

Cold War 2.0 is absolutely where we are. I just want to make sure we’re not running it with 1.0 assumptions. Which many still do.... Just hope leaders are not stuck on it.

 

[NuclearID]

I just want to make sure we’re not running it with 1.0 assumptions.

I mean my god people are still clinging to the myth that nuclear winter will happen with fewer than a thousand warheads, most of which are kiloton class, not megaton at the ready now a days.

Let’s be real, 99% of you will survive WWIII at least the first few days (before starvation kicks in). But it won’t be the end of the earth, and it sure as hell won’t be the end of the weather.

Again, it’s not the 80s anymore. There are no megaton warheads in bulk. There aren’t tens of thousands of nukes on hair trigger alert. The idea of nuclear winter just doesn’t hold up when you look at the numbers in today’s arsenal.


Edit:
(Off topic, if conversation starts around nuclear winter will start thread for it. Just was using this as example to back up my statement earlier.)

 

[DEFCON Warning System]

It’s about recognizing that doctrine can lag behind conditions, and when the conditions change fast whether through C3I disruption, satellite loss, or escalation fog decision making doesn’t always follow or alow a clean script or ladder...

I do want to say that if satellites are being lost, it changes the calculus. My point was that we were only talking about the loss of a fleet, and I stand by position that such a loss by itself would not necessarily result in a nuclear response.

 

[NuclearID]

I do want to say that if satellites are being lost, it changes the calculus. My point was that we were only talking about the loss of a fleet

And I said that if fleets are being attacked then sunk, then by that point C3I & ISR are certainly being targeted as well.

It’s about denying the enemy escalation dominance. If you're wondering why C3I and ISR would be attacked before or shortly thereafter.

That's exactly why... by the time fleets are being sunk, the gloves are already off and if you don’t understand why ISR and C3I would be next or already been/being targeted, you’ve missed the tempo of modern warfare entirely.

 

[RiffRaff]

I do want to say that if satellites are being lost, it changes the calculus. My point was that we were only talking about the loss of a fleet, and I stand by position that such a loss by itself would not necessarily result in a nuclear response.

It wouldn't be instant or automatic, no, but It's a definite strategic escalation, which is dangerous. If a US carrier or carrier strike group was destroyed by China, tell me DWS wouldn't go to DEFCON 3 with almost no hesitation. There would be a pause, during which a nuclear response would certainly be discussed at high levels as an option, but it might or might not be initiated.

I agree with DN up to a point, but I do think it's possible for a fleet to be sunk without a nuclear response being a foregone conclusion. However, we would be irresponsible not to consider it a possibility.

 

[DEFCON Warning System]

then by that point C3I & ISR are certainly being targeted as well.

We don't know that. China is wary of an escalation. They believe the US won't fully commit to an Asian war. But start affecting the homeland and that pulls the US in.

China's plan is to make the war painful enough that the US wants to pull out. Not so painful that the US has to up its commitment.

 

[DEFCON Warning System]

If a US carrier or carrier strike group was destroyed by China, tell me DWS wouldn't go to DEFCON 3 with almost no hesitation.

Not to make any commitments, especially in a public forum, but I can see that happening.

 

[NuclearID]

We don't know that. China is wary of an escalation. They believe the US won't fully commit to an Asian war. But start affecting the homeland and that pulls the US in.

China's plan is to make the war painful enough that the US wants to pull out. Not so painful that the US has to up its commitment.

China does prefer calibrated escalation and limited objectives.

But that assumes control over the chaos of real modern warfare, which never holds past the first few punches.

Once fleets are sunk naturally next step if not already by that point is about denying the enemy escalation dominance.

Once satellites blinded, and comms degraded, intentions become irrelevant. It’s reaction chains from there.

China may want to avoid escalation, but escalation doesn’t ask for permission. Modern tempo/structure of warfare doesn’t give you a script to follow... it gives you a ticking clock racing a mile a minute and fog of war.

 

[NuclearID]

China does prefer calibrated escalation and limited objectives.

HOWEVER, China does not understand escalation boundaries. HUGE distinction.

China plays brinkmanship like a sport. Constant probing, salami slicing, unmarked militia ships, and gray zone ops. And that’s exactly what makes escalation with them dangerous.

Just ask India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and even Australia how well China respects escalation boundaries.

 

[NuclearID]

May I add, Indo - Pakistani wars and conflicts didnt escalate into nuclear conflict. ( both are nuclear capable )

They have another form of leadership though. And if there is a scenario where you can checkmate the other side, why wouldnt you use a tactical nuke to end the conflict.

But that assumes control over the chaos of real modern warfare, which never holds past the first few punches.

Quick Reminder:
We’re discussing modern peer to peer warfare between two nuclear major powers. That means examples like Ukraine/Russia or Indo/Pak aren’t applicable in this discussion, not even slightly. They are not modern peers as US/China.

Those are either asymmetric conflicts or limited regional wars. What we are talking about involves strategic parity, hardened infrastructure, real time satellite warfare, and escalation chains that can unravel in minutes. Different scale, different times, different tech, different rules we are discussing here.

 

[Sentry]

While I understand your point, how is Indo/Pak not a valid comparison? They are both peer nuclear powers too, pretty evenly matched conventionally too I think.

 

[NuclearID]

While I understand your point, how is Indo/Pak not a valid comparison? They are both peer nuclear powers too, pretty evenly matched conventionally too I think.

The Indo/Pak comparison falls apart entirly when you factor in second strike capability, surveillance saturation, C3I infrastructure, real time ISR, and the scale of global entanglements. Not to "dis" Pakistan but... let's be real here.

US & China war it’s about full spectrum modern warfighting across cyber, orbital, naval, and all three nuclear domains. Indo/Pak doesn't operate on that level.

This isn’t just “nuke vs nuke.” It’s about infrastructure, tempo, and capability breadth. Different escalation ladder entirely where talking here on this thread.

 

[Torch]

the scale of global entanglements. Not to "dis" Pakistan but... let's be real here.

Well there you go, a gem.

Yes the comparisons are peer to peer with large or massive global engagements.

 

[NuclearID]

Well there you go, a gem.

Yes the comparisons are peer to peer with large or massive global engagements.

Thought you'd get a kick outta that line.

 

[Publius]

The escalation steps still apply, evolved but apply.
A CSG is targeted conventionally or even nuclear. It is rendered combat ineffective.
Anyone ship in that group has the ability to report this to the national command leadership. Satellite and drone has the ability to report status.
( conventional pause and assessment process kicks in here as normal. But with modern parameters and capabilities). It’s going to be fast but it is still a process because NCA still is operational.

A completely different attack is carried out. A sufficient number of satellites are disabled by any means that disables Global communications.
This is a complete different animal and scope of effect upon the escalation ladder than an attack on a CSG.
And sad is evenly a more detrimental or weightier matter that strictly a CSG.

What might shed some clarification here follows. Attacking and disabling a CSG is tactically a “regional” attack and importance.
It is not an imminent national strategic attack.
The nation still had other means to collect and disseminate information for the national command structure.

Now NCA might very well decide to respond with a nuclear response.
But the decision to do so will still follow conventional decision making process.

Is it warranted?
Is there a conventional means to delver a reciprocal response?
Is escalating from conventional to nuclear defensible in the court of public opinion?
What counter response might China respond with.
Can or should we risk a major nuclear exchange over this.


A CSG is a massive tactical force and footprint.
By itself though it is not an indispensable component of the nations Command and control authority.