Reading NuclearID’s comment here got me thinking. With the Iran war now coming to a close, what are the chances that EU’s eastern flank/Ukraine becomes another flashpoint? I feel that out of all the world’s crises, this would be the most likely to lead to nuclear use. As of now, tempo seems to be relatively stagnant, but boarding on non status quo. Kind of getting worried…..
It’s also from 2016
Yes which is why I have worded it very carefully including in the title. I feel like we're in a pre-crisis scenario. We are NOT in a crisis, there is NO emergency, the sky is NOT falling, nor will it fall anytime soon.
Just for the hell of it, what do you deem “our near future?” A few weeks? 1-3 months? Should I look into canceling into plans traveling out of state if things get bad?
It wildly depends... On a lot of factors... IMHO. Near future to me could mean within the next month or 6 months.
What Russia fights Ukraine with is not what Russia will fight NATO with, these two distinctions matter a whole lot in analysis when it comes to deterrence between the both. Russia has been building and stockpiling it's advanced weaponry and not using it at all, all this time.So the battlefield isn't as lopsided as many like to think & the leaders all know this.
Which is why I firmly believe if Putin or Russia were to test NATO it would NOT be official military action at all. It would be an insurgency or a rebellion inside a bordertown in NATO on Russian border.
Would be a win win for Putin, WORST case scenario for Putin is NATO scrambles and expels the unmarked/flagless rebellion. BEST case scenario for Putin is NATO can't get it shit together and a small bordertown revolt breaks the alliance.
I must have misread the date and saw 2026.
A simply superb analysis there. Quite better than any I’ve come across in the MSM, imo.It wildly depends... On a lot of factors... IMHO. Near future to me could mean within the next month or 6 months.
The factors in considering is Iran war and weather Trump tries to gain a quick "win" over Cuba over his loss on Iran.
If Trump goes after Cuba shortly after Iran calms down. A month before things get truly "bumpy" in Europe.
If Trump doesn't go after Cuba. Than maybe 6 months or not at all. Putin is dumb. But he has enough smart people around him IMHO to make somewhat the right "calls."
If Putin or others around him think US to distracted and drawn out enough after Iran war, then Cuba... putin may move to test NATO rather quickly.
A LOT OF PEOPLE FORGET that Russia has since the start of the Ukraine war in 2014 been building up its modern and advanced weaponry, VERY well despite sanctions, by in large not using said advanced weaponry on Ukraine, rather building low tier tech trench warfare to fight Ukraine, while saving/building it's advanced stockpiles.
So while Russia's trench warfare capabilities are drawn out it's high tech or more advanced weaponry has been building and stockpiling since the start of war. NATO leadership must be aware of this especially if I'm aware of it. SO...
This isn't some disproportionate battlefield statistic, Russia can absolutely most likely still hold toe to toe in an initial conflict with NATO as Russia has spared, stockpiled, and built up most of its advanced weaponry while not using it in Ukraine, saving it as a deterrent to NATO.
BUT I WOULDN'T EXPECT MOST to know this since Western media likes to talk a lot of crap about Russia. Me included. Guilty... But sadly it's not all true....
With Trump being so wishy washy on the NATO alliance, that also gives more 'juice" so to speak to any Russian planners on the probability or outcome of testing NATO.
Which in my opinion generates great risk because just because the United States won't defend NATO at least publicly leaves a lot of ambiguity because there are still other NATO members who can besides the United States.
Not only that even if the United States was unwilling to defend NATO we have a bunch of troops in NATO and if Russia were to attack NATO any US troops caught in cross fire will automatically drag us in.
Thank you. I needed that compliment today.
Nah. First glance just same old Russian antics.
It is an oft excuse to intervene. It's what Russia used in Georgia and Ukraine.
Which is why any crisis with Russia and the West is particularly peculiar, because any typical analysis from anybody who is Western or institutionally Western cannot truly debate or analyze what Russia will do. As anyone outside of the Russian government truly doesn't know how they feel or what they're thinking. And anyone who has grown up outside of Russia doesn't understand the logic even in its most simplistic forms.
There's actually a movie about this very scenario but in Finland. A pretty good watch even though there are some unrealistic elements added because it's well, a movie, but still pretty good. It's called Konflikti (Conflict)Which is why I firmly believe if Putin or Russia were to test NATO it would NOT be official military action at all. It would be an insurgency or a rebellion inside a bordertown in NATO on Russian border.
For example some Lithuanian town (on border with Russia) with maybe a hundred people or a little more. A bunch of locals rise up expell the government and police, try to declare independence, or try to secede to Russia.
They would be unmarked men so that way Russia could do plausible deniability that's why even if NATO did attack these quote unquote rebels, it wouldn't start world War III.
At least that would be the smart option. Weather Russia is smart or not is left to be determined. But again doesn't matter if Russia is smart or not they have been stockpiling enough advance weaponry to make any confrontation not acceptable to NATO.
So…..conventional or otherwise? I can’t seem to recall in all my times of monitoring this conflict the Russian MFA actively telling foreigners to “get out” before an attack, lest striking “decision making centers” in Kyiv. Yikes.
Personally speaking only, I still believe it will be conventional . This past weekend they used, or at least reported to use, their Oreshnik multi munition missile. It will probably involve more of these.
Well, it’s good to see that they’re at least somewhat focused on escalation mitigation if they want to avoid non-Ukrainian casualties…..
