Russia may have been using those radars to track the ballistic trajectory of ATACMS.
It does not compromise the abilities of Russia's strategic missile force to detect enemy missile launches.
Until we see something more concrete than the current rhetoric coming out of Russia, we can't justify going to DEFCON 4.
Okay, let's say we went to DEFCON 4. When would you go back to 5 (remember, you can't stay at 4 for more than a few months)?
Because that Western equipment is there now, by your statements we'd have to stay at 4 for the rest of the war, which we can't.
I think Russia is claiming the red lines are closer than in reality. Remember, Russia has officially annexed parts of Ukraine, so technically from Russia's point of view Ukraine has been bombing their sovereign territory for a while now. If Russia retaliated against a strike on military positions inside internationally recognised Russia they would have to acknowledge that their annexed parts of Ukraine aren't their territory.
Putin doesn't want a war with NATO any more than NATO does, he plays up the nuclear threats to deter aid to Ukraine. When it comes down to brass tacks, Putin won't bomb the Netherlands because an F-16 donated from them bombs military targets.
Are things more escalated than usual? Yes.
Does it warrant a level change at the moment? No.
Thank's you for the exaustive answer. I understand what you say and I rely very much on your DEFCON level prevision. Therefore, as I always agree with that prevision, I think you are right and that I am miscalcotaing the risk.
However, I want to point out some considerations:
1. as he had just said Citizen-21, the attack against the radar is extremely serious in itself and has strategic rilevance;
2.
I think Russia is claiming the red lines are closer than in reality. Remember, Russia has officially annexed parts of Ukraine, so technically from Russia's point of view Ukraine has been bombing their sovereign territory for a while now. If Russia retaliated against a strike on military positions inside internationally recognised Russia they would have to acknowledge that their annexed parts of Ukraine aren't their territory.
I don't know if Russia makes this raisonement. As I better said in one of my last posts, there is a difference between a disputed territory - as Crimea - and a not disputed territory. As I said, I suppose that Russia had not heavily retaliated to the strikes against Crimea, beacuse it adopted a kind of "Plan B", in which military operations could have continued with success from the north-est: Crimea would have been in peace, once finished the war. So, to escalate the war for a disputed territory, while the desired end-state could have been achieved in a less dangererous way, was not a rewarding choice. But now the situation is different: there are 2 "good" reasons for Russia to react differently.
The first: Russia, once its rears into Russian soil are hit, it will not have anymore other sides where to move from, in order to continue its military operations. So, basically, if it doesn't escalate, Russia will finally has not other choices but to retreat. But a retreat leaves also Crimea alone: without the possibility to win the war, there will be not chances for Crimea to avoid to be hit by Ukraine. So, the retreat actually means to leave Crimea to Ukraine.
The second: strikes inside Russia, will give to Russians the idea that their Country is under attack, and it is extremely dangerous: it's the Ukranian war starting go outside Ukraine. It will became for Russia a defensive war in its own territory. So, what Russia is supposed to do to make the attacks end? Let's suppose that Russia retreats into its recognized borders (that it finally means, as I said, to leave also Crimea), then who can ensures Russia that Ukraine/NATO strikes into Russia will end? Ukraine will likely ask to Russia to create, into its own territory, a buffer area garanting the impossibility to make in the future further attacks in Ukraine. Then it could ask something else. It could enter Russia in order to free the population who lives there from the Putin's regime. Then it will be the collapse of Russia, which is the maximum desired end-state for NATO. Russia know all these things. And these things are the consequences of the strikes into Russian territory without an "appropriate" reaction. So, if strikes inside Russia territory begin, I don't think that Russian raisonement will be "I do nothing, because if I do, it is an admission that other part of Ukraine aren't my territory";
3.
Okay, let's say we went to DEFCON 4. When would you go back to 5 (remember, you can't stay at 4 for more than a few months)?
Because that Western equipment is there now, by your statements we'd have to stay at 4 for the rest of the war, which we can't.
Not necessarily. At the moment, we can just make hypothesis about the future. But for example we can see that strikes against Russian territory will be the usual red line 1000 miles large. We can see that Russia will actually retreat. We can see an other kind of unexpected balance settling down, a kind of brend "new normal", allowing to return to 5. Who knows. Or maybe it could be established a long time situation in which it become hard to say if DEFCON is 5 or 4. I hate the sites the sites going to DEFCON 1 for silly reasons, but I currently agree with DEFCON 5 only for the trust I have in your judgment, who you surely have more information then me.
4.
Putin doesn't want a war with NATO any more than NATO does, he plays up the nuclear threats to deter aid to Ukraine. When it comes down to brass tacks, Putin won't bomb the Netherlands because an F-16 donated from them bombs military targets.
I didn't said that DEFCON level could be 2. At the litterally present day, it's hard to imagine as impeding what you said. But something like that is just where are centered the mechanisms put in motion. and they seems to be not so far. Something like that is not unthinkable onces "NATO" stikes into Russia become true. To consider deterrence as something purely formal, it's like to consider a nuclear state as it is not a nuclear state at all. I know you don't have this positions, but I am persuaded that when Putin speaks about nuclear threats, it's because he sees the direction of the events. And at the "end" of these events, the use of some kind of nuke seems to be a little more then "formal".