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UA-RU-NATO War | Discussions | Jun. 1st/Sep. 13th 2025

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Yep; that's all they're good for nowadays - range extenders for cruise missiles. However; Russia has been relying more heavily on drones in its attack waves, and this trend is expected to continue. See here:
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I agree, and this may possibly be in Russia's favor. There does not seem to be any reason to maintain a strategic bomber fleet, especially if you're trying to fight a major war on a budget (at Russia is currently doing). ICBMs/SLBMs are perfectly sufficient to maintain nuclear deterrence, and Russia would do well to divest itself of its obsolete strategic bomber wing (note: some of those airframes were built 70 years ago).
They’re still heavily reliant on them as a delivery system since they’re afraid of being targeted near Ukraine’s border. Everyone of these attacks shows Russia they’re not untouchable no matter where they hide munitions.
 
A significant portion of Russia’s Triad is being compromised with this attack.

In my opinion this puts a tactical nuclear response on the table, but only after a massive conventional ballistic missile strike.
This does limit Russia's ability to respond, which would put them more on the defensive.
 
This does limit Russia's ability to respond, which would put them more on the defensive.
Don’t be so certain Russia would be defensive.

There’s absolutely discussions happening about “existential this” and “existential that”. Strike now before we can’t win, etc.

Russia will always have nuclear hardliners within the upper echelons.
 
Don’t be so certain Russia would be defensive.

There’s absolutely discussions happening about “existential this” and “existential that”. Strike now before we can’t win, etc.
Two points:
  • How do you know?
  • Do not mistake the media circus for the actual discussions that are going on in the Russian corridors of power. Russia is not existentially threatened by Ukraine unless/until the latter acquires nuclear weapons of its own (which does not appear likely).
 
There's no certainty about the destruction of 50% of the Russian aircraft. I've seen some sources say it was a third, others say several.

"A Ukrainian security source indicated that drones were smuggled into Russia and hidden in wooden structures placed on trucks. Their roofs were then opened remotely, allowing the drones to fly to their targets.
If true, it's pretty amazing that they managed to catch the Russians with their proverbial pants down, and reflects great credit upon the UA special forces.
 
Do not mistake the media circus for the actual discussions that are going on in the Russian corridors of power. Russia is not existentially threatened by Ukraine unless/until the latter acquires nuclear weapons of its own (which does not appear likely).
Not arguing this is the case; but here perception and how the Russian leadership feels is key. If Putin feels threatened by the loss of a chunk of his strategic bombers, then that matters. Him still having SLBMs and ICBMs as nuclear deterrence is not something he will think about at that moment.
You're assuming competence and rationality. I think Russia has demonstrated they have neither.
 
Two points:
  • How do you know?
  • Do not mistake the media circus for the actual discussions that are going on in the Russian corridors of power. Russia is not existentially threatened by Ukraine unless/until the latter acquires nuclear weapons of its own (which does not appear likely).
Second point first - I haven’t watched a single second of media on this. I just have a deep understanding of the escalation ladder, and what chess moves come next.

First point - Discussions that have to do with national defense in a wartime scenario will have two extreme viewpoints and a middle viewpoint. Emotions will run high.
 
Thing is that, it would be reasonable to feel threatened by the lost of strategic bombers like that (even if it's russian's fault)

Any nation's government would be worried af after enduring that. What will matter if it Putin wants to lose the losses and finally negociate to stop that war. Or if he will continue the war (and if so, how)
 
Not arguing this is the case; but here perception and how the Russian leadership feels is key. If Putin feels threatened by the loss of a chunk of his strategic bombers, then that matters. Him still having SLBMs and ICBMs as nuclear deterrence is not something he will think about at that moment.
You're assuming competence and rationality. I think Russia has demonstrated they have neither.
Why, though? Russia feels it's strategically winning, and I'm inclined to agree. And as for a putative nuclear response - it doesn't really hinge upon how Putin feels on any given day. Like any entrenched nuclear state, Russia has procedures and protocols. Putin is pretty crazy, but I don't believe he's crazy enough to override those. At the end of the day, the shots are called by the Russian General Staff while Putin simply signs on the dotted line. I'm gonna say you're underestimating the immense inertia that's baked into the system...
 
Why, though? Russia feels it's strategically winning, and I'm inclined to agree. And as for a putative nuclear response - it doesn't really hinge upon how Putin feels on any given day. Like any entrenched nuclear state, Russia has procedures and protocols. Putin is pretty crazy, but I don't believe he's crazy enough to override those. At the end of the day, the shots are called by the Russian General Staff while Putin simply signs on the dotted line. I'm gonna say you're underestimating the immense inertia that's baked into the system...
So, you’re saying Putin has no actual authority over his nuclear forces?
 
So, you’re saying Putin has no actual authority over his nuclear forces?
He does in the sense that he is presented with a dossier by some people in uniform who say "this is what we think we should do" - and approves (or rejects) it. At the present juncture I very much doubt that the dossier says "we should go nuclear".

I could be wrong, of course.
 
He does in the sense that he is presented with a dossier by some people in uniform who say "this is what we think we should do" - and approves (or rejects) it. At the present juncture I very much doubt that the dossier says "we should go nuclear".

I could be wrong, of course.
What you’re saying makes little sense.

Putin can absolutely launch a nuclear strike at the drop of a hat if necessary.
 
Hard disagree here. Putin, just like Trump, has no barriers to ordering a nuclear strike. Both countries operate at a very high level of nuclear readiness.
That statement is true, but misleading. Most nuclear-capable countries (and both the US and Russia certainly count) operate at a "very high level of nuclear readiness" in the sense that they have some nuclear capability on standby to launch a nuclear attack if the fecal matter is actually perceived as about to collide with the overhead air displacement unit. This is emphatically not the same as being eager - or even willing - to launch a nuclear attack in response to whatever craziness is ongoing in the conventional sphere.
 
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