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- Jan 23, 2020
A significant portion of Russia’s Triad is being compromised with this attack.A nuclear response.
In my opinion this puts a tactical nuclear response on the table, but only after a massive conventional ballistic missile strike.
A significant portion of Russia’s Triad is being compromised with this attack.A nuclear response.
And yet here we are. Elections have consequences.Even if I was a Trump supporter this is not how I would want my elected officials offering condolences to a nation state that has maimed and killed Americans and our allies.
They’re still heavily reliant on them as a delivery system since they’re afraid of being targeted near Ukraine’s border. Everyone of these attacks shows Russia they’re not untouchable no matter where they hide munitions.Yep; that's all they're good for nowadays - range extenders for cruise missiles. However; Russia has been relying more heavily on drones in its attack waves, and this trend is expected to continue. See here:
View attachment 7427
I agree, and this may possibly be in Russia's favor. There does not seem to be any reason to maintain a strategic bomber fleet, especially if you're trying to fight a major war on a budget (at Russia is currently doing). ICBMs/SLBMs are perfectly sufficient to maintain nuclear deterrence, and Russia would do well to divest itself of its obsolete strategic bomber wing (note: some of those airframes were built 70 years ago).
This does limit Russia's ability to respond, which would put them more on the defensive.A significant portion of Russia’s Triad is being compromised with this attack.
In my opinion this puts a tactical nuclear response on the table, but only after a massive conventional ballistic missile strike.
Don’t be so certain Russia would be defensive.This does limit Russia's ability to respond, which would put them more on the defensive.
Two points:Don’t be so certain Russia would be defensive.
There’s absolutely discussions happening about “existential this” and “existential that”. Strike now before we can’t win, etc.
If true, it's pretty amazing that they managed to catch the Russians with their proverbial pants down, and reflects great credit upon the UA special forces.There's no certainty about the destruction of 50% of the Russian aircraft. I've seen some sources say it was a third, others say several.
"A Ukrainian security source indicated that drones were smuggled into Russia and hidden in wooden structures placed on trucks. Their roofs were then opened remotely, allowing the drones to fly to their targets.
Not arguing this is the case; but here perception and how the Russian leadership feels is key. If Putin feels threatened by the loss of a chunk of his strategic bombers, then that matters. Him still having SLBMs and ICBMs as nuclear deterrence is not something he will think about at that moment.Do not mistake the media circus for the actual discussions that are going on in the Russian corridors of power. Russia is not existentially threatened by Ukraine unless/until the latter acquires nuclear weapons of its own (which does not appear likely).
Second point first - I haven’t watched a single second of media on this. I just have a deep understanding of the escalation ladder, and what chess moves come next.Two points:
- How do you know?
- Do not mistake the media circus for the actual discussions that are going on in the Russian corridors of power. Russia is not existentially threatened by Ukraine unless/until the latter acquires nuclear weapons of its own (which does not appear likely).
Why, though? Russia feels it's strategically winning, and I'm inclined to agree. And as for a putative nuclear response - it doesn't really hinge upon how Putin feels on any given day. Like any entrenched nuclear state, Russia has procedures and protocols. Putin is pretty crazy, but I don't believe he's crazy enough to override those. At the end of the day, the shots are called by the Russian General Staff while Putin simply signs on the dotted line. I'm gonna say you're underestimating the immense inertia that's baked into the system...Not arguing this is the case; but here perception and how the Russian leadership feels is key. If Putin feels threatened by the loss of a chunk of his strategic bombers, then that matters. Him still having SLBMs and ICBMs as nuclear deterrence is not something he will think about at that moment.
You're assuming competence and rationality. I think Russia has demonstrated they have neither.
So, you’re saying Putin has no actual authority over his nuclear forces?Why, though? Russia feels it's strategically winning, and I'm inclined to agree. And as for a putative nuclear response - it doesn't really hinge upon how Putin feels on any given day. Like any entrenched nuclear state, Russia has procedures and protocols. Putin is pretty crazy, but I don't believe he's crazy enough to override those. At the end of the day, the shots are called by the Russian General Staff while Putin simply signs on the dotted line. I'm gonna say you're underestimating the immense inertia that's baked into the system...
Hard disagree here. Putin, just like Trump, has no barriers to ordering a nuclear strike. Both countries operate at a very high level of nuclear readiness.At the end of the day, the shots are called by the Russian General Staff while Putin simply signs on the dotted line.
He does in the sense that he is presented with a dossier by some people in uniform who say "this is what we think we should do" - and approves (or rejects) it. At the present juncture I very much doubt that the dossier says "we should go nuclear".So, you’re saying Putin has no actual authority over his nuclear forces?
What you’re saying makes little sense.He does in the sense that he is presented with a dossier by some people in uniform who say "this is what we think we should do" - and approves (or rejects) it. At the present juncture I very much doubt that the dossier says "we should go nuclear".
I could be wrong, of course.
That statement is true, but misleading. Most nuclear-capable countries (and both the US and Russia certainly count) operate at a "very high level of nuclear readiness" in the sense that they have some nuclear capability on standby to launch a nuclear attack if the fecal matter is actually perceived as about to collide with the overhead air displacement unit. This is emphatically not the same as being eager - or even willing - to launch a nuclear attack in response to whatever craziness is ongoing in the conventional sphere.Hard disagree here. Putin, just like Trump, has no barriers to ordering a nuclear strike. Both countries operate at a very high level of nuclear readiness.
if the fecal matter is actually perceived as about to collide with the overhead air displacement unit
I agree. But then - why are we still alive?What you’re saying makes little sense.
Putin can absolutely launch a nuclear strike at the drop of a hat if necessary.
Because Putin has not pressed the red button yet. If Putin wanted to conduct a nuclear strike, there is nothing stopping him.I agree. But then - why are we still alive?
